century a history of growing industrialism, supposedly closing physical frontiers, rapid urbanization, unequal distribution of wealth, and an overdependence upon export trade. These historical currents clashed in the 1890s. The result was chaos and fear, then war and empire.

In 1898 McKinley and the business community wanted peace, but they also sought benefits which only a war could provide. Viewed from the perspective of the 1960s, the Spanish-American conflict can no longer be viewed as only a "splendid little war." It was a war to preserve the American system.

GERALD F. LINDERMAN

from The Image of Enemy and Ally [1974]

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In nineteenth-century America . . . [n]o people fared worse in the schoolbooks than the Spanish. In the American view, Spanish history was a syllabus of barbarism that left both participants and their progeny morally misshapen. Such an image, moreover, did not exist only as an intellectual abstraction. With so few alternative sources of information available, it often set the lines of political debate. In the prelude to the Spanish-American War those who wished to resist American intervention in Cuba were handicapped by their inability to say anything in defense of the Spanish character. Those who urged American participation had the easier task of demonstrating that Spanish behavior was the simple extension of that Spanish history every American had memorized from his reader.

Americans at first hardly distinguished the image of the Cuban from that of the Spaniard. As anger against Spain mounted, however, it became necessary for them to differentiate, to convert to ally the enemy of their enemy. This was accomplished, but not through any objective examination of the conditions or attributes of the Cuban people. Instead, Americans of public consequence employed various and often contradictory historical analogies which, with scant reference to the Cubans themselves, had by 1898 persuaded most Americans that the Cubans were a moral, enlightened, and kindred race. The first physical contacts of American with Cuban and Spaniard would test these images of good and evil.

In mid-December 1895 President Grover Cleveland and Secretary of State Richard Olney precipitated a diplomatic crisis over a fifty-year-old boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain's colony of Guiana. Angry at London's rejection of earlier Washington suggestions that the controversy be submitted to arbitration, the president announced to Congress on December 17 his decision to appoint an American commission to determine the "true divisional line" between the two territories. Once the boundary was set, Cleveland warned, "it will . . . be the duty of the United States to resist, by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which . . . we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." The United States, charging Britain with violating the Monroe Doctrine, threatened war. . . .

Of special concern here are the terms employed by Americans in debating the meaning of Britain's behavior.

Joseph Pulitzer — in 1864 an emaciated German-Hungarian immigrant without resources save for his own will to succeed, thirty years later the powerful publisher of the New York *World* whose extraordinary energies had already cracked the frail shell of his body — was one of those who led public opposition to Cleveland's policy. The president's bludgeon diplomacy, he told the *World*'s half-million readers, was "a grave blunder"; an Anglo-American war would be unpardonable folly. Into his antiwar editorials Pulitzer wove three themes. There was in the Venezuelan dispute, he insisted, no possible menace to the United States. He further denied Cleveland's contention that the controversy challenged, or that its outcome could affect, the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, he cautioned against what he judged to be the nation's state: "Let the war idea once dominate the minds of the American people and war will come whether there is cause for it or not" — an interesting hypothesis that Pulitzer himself did much to verify two years later.

Laced through these arguments were the lineaments of an image of a Britain benevolently disposed to American interests, of an admirable people[,] friend rather than foe. England was a "friendly and kindred nation," "the great naval and commercial and banking nation of the world" whose political system was "essentially . . . of the people, more quickly and completely responsible to the popular will as expressed in the elections than our government is." . . .

In short, who the English were determined what the English did. By definition, kindred peoples would not harm one another's vital interests in Venezuela or anywhere else. War was incomprehensible when Anglo-American ties meant that it must be a species of civil war.

Supporters of the Cleveland-Olney ultimatum wove into their attack on the English a very different image. Henry Cabot Lodge charged that the British government, having already hemmed in the United States with a fortified line in the Pacific, was forging another ring in the Caribbean. London had recently fortified Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and Jamaica. The

South American mainland was the next, but not the final, link. "If . . . [Britain] can do it successfully in Venezuela she can do it in Mexico or Cuba; if she can do it other nations can also."

Lodge found nothing remarkable in such notions of British conspiracy. It was the thing to expect of a people no less treacherous and hostile to American interests than any other people. As he earlier told the Senate, "Since we parted from England her statesmen have never failed to recognize that in men speaking her language, and of her own race she was to find her most formidable rivals. She has always opposed, thwarted, and sought to injure us." . . .

Did England's behavior constitute a threat to the United States? One's answer had less to do with London's behavior in this particular controversy, still less with what was transpiring on the banks of the Orinoco, than on the image of England that Cleveland's message summoned to mind. The availability of alternative images set the lines of the American debate.

In a valuable study Ruth Miller Elson has suggested the influence of the stereotyped figures of foreign nationalities so prominent in the grammar-school readers one hundred years ago. The belief that specific personality traits inhere in all members of designated nationality groups is still today a part of our intellectual baggage, but several factors added to the tyranny of nineteenth-century national images. Children, spending on average far fewer years in school, were deeply stamped by the long passages they were compelled to memorize. Moreover, American small-town life offered few of the experiences that today render rigid national stereotypes vulnerable to a more complex reality. Only the rich traveled abroad. Few European tourists or cultural organizations visited this country. . . .

A people buoyed by a sense of its own uniqueness, requiring no continuous relationships with other nationalities, and lacking bridges between its own and other cultures, was likely to find authoritative the lessons of the reader, "that first and only formal presentation of other nations."

The world of the nineteenth-century schoolbook was almost static. Authors precipitated from each nation's history certain men and events on which they pronounced moral judgment and then offered the reader as the embodiment of a collective personality. The character traits thus extracted were often more censorious than complimentary, but almost every characterization combined the two categories. The English, as the rhetoric of the Venezuelan crisis made clear, could be both exemplar and oppressor, a parent solicitous, neglectful, or cruel. . . .

By contrast, schoolbooks found almost nothing to praise in the Spanish. . . . Characteristics that drew American attention (though not necessarily praise) at midcentury — Spanish dignity, honor, military prowess — were subject to slow dilution, it seemed, as Spain disintegrated. That was nothing worthy, and much that was repugnant to Americans, in a conqueror grown indolent. . . .

"No single good thing in law, or science, or art, or literature . . . has resulted to the race of men . . . from Spanish domination in America. . . . I have tried to think of one in vain," announced Charles Francis Adams

in 1897. The same theme received scholarly treatment six months later when the president of the University of Wisconsin asked graduating seniors: "What has Spain ever done for civilization? What books, what inventions have come from Spain? What discoveries in the laboratory or in scientific fields?" His own answer was brief: "So few have they been that they are scarcely worth mentioning." He then returned in the climax of his address to the central American perception of Spain — changeless cruelty. "Examination of the Spanish character shows it to be the same as it was centuries ago. Wherever the Spaniard has endeavored to rule he has shown an unrivaled incapacity for government. And the incapacity was such and the cruelty was such that all their colonies and provinces have slipped away." . . .

The image's ability to distort reality, to obscure the logic of particular situations, was most pronounced at the time of the *Maine*'s destruction. Today, though neither proven nor disproven, official Spanish culpability seems unlikely: Spain had nothing to gain, and much to lose, by sinking the vessel. Today the American rush to condemn Spain appears a psychic aberration, a lapse into irrationality. At the time, however, the image of the Spaniard made any *other* explanation appear illogical. A sneak bombing against a background of treacherous assurances of Spanish goodwill; sleeping men plunged to watery graves — it was Spanish history come alive, this time with young Americans as its victims. Rough-shaped pieces of fact could be made to fit. When the Havana command offered the American survivors expressions of regret and every appropriate aid, Henry Watterson concluded that, while Cuban sadness was genuine, Spanish sympathy, so "ostentatious," must conceal an inward festiveness. . . .

If there was near unanimity on the nature of the enemy, there remained considerable uncertainty regarding his capacity. The Spaniard was malevolent, all agreed, but what danger did he pose for Americans? On this point the image was ambiguous. Henry Cabot Lodge had spoken of Spain as "mediaeval, cruel, dying." How rapid was her decline? How much harm was she still capable of inflicting on others?

These questions produced speculation and considerable anxiety. Since there could be no definitive answers short of a test of arms, Americans anticipated war with ambivalent emotions. Those who often voiced the fear that the Spanish would not stand and fight could not always suppress the fear that they would. When Henry Watterson complained that Spanish courage was not the courage of "cool tenacity and hope," but that of desperation, others sensed the unspoken corollary: desperate men could exact a high toll from their enemies.

No one caught better than Sherwood Anderson the American vacillation in definitions of Spanish prowess. At one moment he was confident war would be "a kind of glorious national picnic." He could even indulge in a thin guilt that the job would be so easy, "like robbing an old gypsy woman in a vacant lot at night after a fair." In other moments, however, the Spaniard as cyclonic evil seemed very near: "Dark cruel eyes, dark swaggering men in one's fancy." Anderson dreamed of grappling with a

Spanish commandant who, half drunk and surrounded by his concubines, plunged his sword into a serving-boy who had spilled the wine. Americans like Sherwood Anderson, conceiving of themselves as moral vindicators, were given pause: was the Spaniard a still vigorous and thus dangerous evil-doer or only an unrepentant invalid?

This uncertainty may have had some bearing on the undulation of public emotion before and during the Spanish-American War. So often the objective situation seemed insufficient explanation for those roller coaster spurts up and down emotional inclines and through the curves. . . .

Public tension before battles, public jubilation afterward, seems inordinate. The unprecedented celebration of Dewey's victory at Manila Bay suggests relief from the fear of disaster, disaster overtaking Americans in distant islands so exotic and unfamiliar. Dewey was deified. In the Caribbean campaign too there were wide swings of emotion. General Shafter, vacillating between the enemy as destroyer and as invalid, was never able to gauge clearly the danger that the Spanish Army posed for his own forces. Indecisive, he tried in the aftermath of the battle of San Juan to act so as to encompass both images. At the same moment that he telegraphed Washington that his Army was in such extreme danger that he was preparing to retreat, he sent an ultimatum to his opponent demanding the immediate surrender of Santiago. Americans certain of Spanish malevolence but unsure of Spanish power swung rapidly back and forth between an almost swaggering confidence and a deep-seated dread, between excessive celebration and excessive fear.

The image of the Cuban had at first none of the compelling emotional quality of the Spaniard. Indeed, since few Americans prior to 1895 counted the Cubans a distinct people, the image of the ally required simultaneously both separation from the image of the enemy and a delineation of its own.

The crafting of distinctions between Cuban and Spaniard did not begin with the arrival of the news of the Cuban revolt. Americans convinced of Spanish immorality assumed, correctly, that there had been considerable racial mixture in Cuba; Cubans must have thereby inherited every unlovely Spanish trait. Learning of the Cuban insurrection, Americans did not rush to embrace Cubans as kindred. There was no automatic assumption of Cuban virtue as there was of Spanish wrongdoing. Initial statements reveal both denunciation of the Spaniards *and* a deprecation of the *insurrectos* that hewed to Madrid's line. The Cubans were insignificant black rioters or bandits who would be easily dispersed. Richard Franklin Pettigrew, a South Dakota senator who wished war because he thought it would remonetize silver, cared nothing for Spaniard or Cuban: the best idea was to sink the island for twenty-four hours "to get rid of its present population." A prominent Methodist clergyman thought the Cubans "indolent, seditious, ignorant, superstitious and greatly useless." Somewhat less genteel was William Allen White: the Cubans were "Mongrels with no capacity for self government . . . a yellow-legged, knife-sticking, treacherous outfit." Speaker of the House Reed called them "yellow-bellies."

No evidence suggests that Reed, with McKinley a last-ditch opponent of the war, ever changed his mind about Cuban deficiencies. There is, however, ample evidence for the assertion that in the period 1895–97 the majority of Americans began to view Cubans in a favorable, or at least a different, way. It became increasingly difficult to deny sympathy to an enemy of *the* enemy. How could the Spaniards so richly deserve chastisement if the Cubans were undeserving of freedom? How could American strength secure justice for the weak if the weak were themselves malicious? . . .

To some Americans the Cuban rising became a latter-day American Revolution. Richard Harding Davis, watching a Spanish firing squad execute an "erect and soldierly" Cuban youth named Rodriquez, invoked for his many readers the death of Nathan Hale. Governor John P. Altgeld of Illinois declared in public address that the Cubans' struggle was their American Revolution, and Senator George G. Vest of Missouri drew out the moral: the insurrectionists deserved American support because they were emulating the American experience. Senator William E. Mason of Illinois claimed a more substantial connection. Cuban boys had come to our colleges, learned about George Washington and returned home to tell their compatriots. Revolution was an inevitable result. These judgments were based on a widespread but erroneous assumption that the Cubans had revolted to secure, not their own government, but good government on the American model.

Another prominent analogy was that of the Cuban as Southerner. Many former Confederates discovered in Spanish oppression echoes of the North's military occupation of the South during Reconstruction. Joseph Bailey's biographer assigns nine-tenths of the Texan's sympathy to empathy with those whom he thought resisting the same sort of military despotism he had opposed three decades before. . . . Racist and racial liberal thus moved from opposite poles to join hands in support of the Cuban.

Other groups looked to European history for images to unlock the meaning of events in the Caribbean. To staunch Protestants, especially the clergy, the Cubans were another in a series of peoples who had risen against Catholic oppression. (Anti-clericalism was an insignificant factor in the revolt of the Cubans. It was prominent in the Philippines, but few Americans had heard that there was a simultaneous Filipino uprising.) American Catholic publications, unable to support either "brigands" or a revolt advertised by Protestants as anti-Catholic, found a quite different analogy: Cuba was suffering Spanish tyranny as Ireland endured English tyranny. Its persuasiveness lay in the suggestion that the Cubans, like the Irish, were oppressed *because* of their religion, the faithful persecuted for their beliefs. Its weakness lay in the necessity to overlook the Catholicism of the Spaniards. . . .

However confusing and contradictory, the various roles which Americans imposed on the Cuban had one element in common: support for American intervention on behalf of the Cuban. However divided at home on political, economic, or religious grounds, Americans found an appropriate interventionist argument in the grab bag of history. . . .

White Americans of the 1890s were all but unanimous in their belief in black inferiority and the necessity of the social separation of the races. For prominent Americans to champion the aspirations of a mixed people — for a Joseph Wheeler, for example, to wage a viciously negrophobic campaign for the House of Representatives and then refer to Cubans as "our brethren" — required reappraisal of Cuban color and temperament. One avenue . . . involved the bleaching of the Cuban.

In his influential Senate speech of March 17, 1898, Vermont's Redfield Proctor assured his countrymen that better than three of four Cubans were "like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond." The figure whom Americans came to accept as the prototypical victim of Spanish inhumanity, William Randolph Hearst's most successful promotion, the rescued maiden Evangelina Cisneros, was described as possessing "a white face, young, pure and beautiful." The Kansas soldier of fortune Frederick Funston, a volunteer smuggled to the island along underground routes maintained by the Cuban Junta's New York headquarters, wrote that "fully nine-tenths [of the insurrectionists] were white men." General Gomez was himself "of pure Spanish descent." Most Cuban officers were former planters, stockmen, farmers, professionals, and businessmen — "the best men." Later, when Gomez ordered General Garcia to join forces, Funston noted an important difference: rebel units from eastern Cuba contained a much higher proportion of Negroes. Few other Americans were aware of the distinction. Correspondents, almost all of them strongly interventionist, made their way into rebel territory by working east from Havana. Few penetrated easternmost Santiago Province where black Cubans were most numerous. Their reports, like Funston's first letters, conveyed the impression that the Cuban Army was almost entirely white. This misconception would be corrected with abrupt and calamitous results when the Fifth Corps landed only thirty miles from the city of Santiago.

Another theme, Americanization, accompanied the stress on Cuban whiteness. This enlarged the basis of Cuban–American cooperation beyond bonds of color to include temperamental similarities. After a visit to rebel territory, Grover Flint wrote *McClure's Magazine* that Gomez had shown an "Anglo-Saxon tenacity of purpose." The general's staff was "business-like." When Flint and others then praised the Cuban Army for its self-respect, determination, discipline, and concern for its wounded, the insurrectionary forces seemed an organization very similar to the United States Army. A plausible extension would suggest comparable fighting capacities. Here again Americans built unrealistic expectations. In fact they understood neither the Cuban Army nor the nature of the war it was fighting. . . .

Images of ally and enemy reversed rapidly, though not simultaneously. Members of the Fifth Corps reappraised the Cuban almost as they touched the beaches. The Cuban *insurrectos* who greeted them did not *look* like soldiers. Their clothes were in tatters, their weapons a strange assortment,

their equipment woefully incomplete — "a crew," thought Theodore Roosevelt, "as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes ever looked on." . . .

Personal contact converted admiration to disgust. The English correspondent John Black Atkins, noting that the insurgents looked "incredibly tattered and peaked and forlorn," thought "by far the most notable thing" about the American volunteers' reaction "was their sudden, open disavowel of friendliness toward the Cubans." Unaware of the true nature of the Cubans' war, Americans were quick to generalize from appearance to fighting ability. Roosevelt immediately concluded that the Cubans would be useless in "serious fighting." Captain John Bigelow's professional eye caught little more: "Bands of Cubans in ragged and dirty white linen, barefooted, and variously armed, marched past us, carrying Cuban and American flags. . . . The Cubans were evidently undisciplined. I thought from their appearance that they would probably prove useful as guides and scouts, but that we would have to do practically all the fighting." George Kennan of the Red Cross, perhaps the most judicious observer of events in Cuba, found himself struggling to reconcile his preconception of Cuban military prowess with an appearance that seemed to preclude fighting qualities. The *insurrectos* "may have been brave men and good soldiers," but "if their rifles and cartridge belts had been taken away . . . they would have looked like a horde of dirty Cuban beggars and ragamuffins on the tramp."

If before white Americans had imagined Cuban complexions as pale as their own, now the darker shades seemed ubiquitous. Roosevelt thought Cuban soldiers "almost all blacks and mulattoes." In a later letter to Secretary of War Alger, Leonard Wood elaborated the significance of color: the Cuban Army "is made up very considerably of black people, only partially civilized, in whom the old spirit of savagery has been more or less aroused by years of warfare, during which time they have reverted more or less to the condition of men taking what they need and living by plunder." . . .

Cuban behavior soon joined appearance as the next item in a lengthening indictment of the ally. American soldiers had accepted earnestly public declarations of their country's unselfishness in entering the war; they did, nevertheless, expect a return. Implicit in the dominant concept of the war — the disinterested relief of suffering Cubans — was the confidence that Cubans would view themselves as victims delivered from oppression and would be grateful. In reality, there was little Cuban gratitude. No cheering greeted the American landings. The *insurrecto* accepted gifts of American rations but, thought Stephen Crane, "with the impenetrable indifference or ignorance of the greater part of the people in an ordinary slum." "We feed him and he expresses no joy." The volunteers could not miss Cuban stolidity. At first surprised, they became resentful and then angry.

Additional disillusionment was to come. Sharing his rations in what he thought an act of charity, the volunteer who went unthanked was not likely

to repeat the gesture, especially when it was already obvious that the Army commissariat could not keep his own stomach full. The hungry *insurrecto*, however, contrasting the supply bonanza on the beach with his own meager resources, concluded that the Americans would hardly miss what would suffice to feed him. He returned several times to his original benefactors, who were perplexed and then indignant at the conversion of charity at lunch-time to obligation by the dinner hour. When the Cubans found that this method produced diminishing results, they began pilfering from food stocks and picking up discarded items of equipment. With each episode American contempt grew.

Other Cuban behavior antagonized the volunteers. The principal charge here, precisely that against the Spaniard, was cruelty. Atkins reported the disgust of Americans watching Cubans stab a bull to death and, later, decapitating a Spaniard caught spying out American positions. After the battle of Santiago Bay, Captain Robley Evans, USN, was shocked by Cubans shooting at Spanish sailors swimming ashore to escape their burning vessels. . . .

Angry at what Cubans did, Americans were equally perturbed by what they would not do — act as labor forces for American fighting units. The Cubans "while loitering in the rear" — half of them feigning illness or simply lazing about, it was reported — refused to aid in building roads or cutting litter poles for the American wounded. They would not act in mere logistical support of American units whose anxiety to close with the enemy would in any case have left little substantial role for the Cubans. . . .

The first trial of Cuban-American cooperation came at Guantanamo where just prior to the main landings a Cuban detachment assisted a unit of Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington. The Cubans, cabled Admiral Sampson to the president, were "of great assistance" in securing the beachhead and repulsing Spanish attacks. Stephen Crane, one of the few Americans to see the landings at both Guantanamo and Daiquiri, was less complimentary. Conceding that the Cubans were at first efficient in supporting Huntington, he insisted that they soon traded the fight for food and a nap. Americans "came down here expecting to fight side by side with an ally, but this ally has done little but stay in the rear and eat Army rations, manifesting an indifference to the cause of Cuban liberty which could not be exceeded by some one who had never heard of it." . . .

A short time later Shafter decided to exclude all *insurrectos* from the ceremony marking Santiago's surrender and to maintain largely intact the city's Spanish administration: "This war," he told Garcia, ". . . is between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, and . . . the surrender . . . was made solely to the American Army." . . .

Disillusionment with America's ally reached those at home very quickly. Correspondents, often busier as participants than as observers, shared the soldiers' bitterness toward the Cuban. Confident of their objectivity and immune to appeals to higher statecraft, they filled their stories with their anger. Just as important was the informal communications network. Visitors

returning home from the war zone and uncensored letters published by the hundreds in hometown newspapers spread the news of Cuban villainy. The speed of the reversal was impressive. On June 30, 1898, an editorial in the Clyde *Enterprise* referred to the Cuban Army, old style, as "a large and effective fighting force of intelligent soldiers, who have already been repeatedly complimented for bravery by the generals of the invading [American] Army. Before this war is over it will be found that the people who for three years have been opposing Spanish tyranny . . . are as brave as any who wear the blue." It was the last such reference. On July 21 the *Enterprise* announced that the Cubans were "worthless allies." . . .

American soldiers concluded shortly after landing that Cubans were no better than Spaniards. The next revelation was equally unexpected: Spaniards were superior to Cubans. . . .

El Caney was a small crossroads hamlet of thatched huts and tileroof buildings dominated by a stone church. On the morning of July 1 Shafter sent units totaling six thousand men under the command of General Henry W. Lawton to seize the town. The resistance was much stiffer than the Americans had expected. Despite the fatalism of the Spanish high command, middle-grade officers and their men, conceding nothing, resisted stubbornly. The fighting lasted into the afternoon. When the church and a nearby fort were at last reduced, almost four hundred of the six hundred defenders were dead, wounded, or captured. The attackers suffered four hundred and forty-one casualties, including eighty-one dead.

At El Caney the stereotyped Spaniard dissolved. As soon as his men overran the final Spanish bastion, General Chaffee advanced to shake the hand of the Spanish lieutenant in charge. In turn, a Spanish officer praised the courage of the Americans who had thrown themselves at Caney's trenches. George Kennan was sure that the "moral effect of this battle was to give each of the combatants a feeling of sincere respect for the bravery of the other." A second battle that day on the San Juan ridges enlarged the volunteers' regard for Spanish valor. Americans whose commander calculated that they would sustain four hundred wounded suffered three times that number. When the crests were finally in American hands, Theodore Roosevelt felt a new esteem for a tenacious enemy. "No men of any nationality could have done better." The Spaniards were "brave foes."

There was a similar, though not identical, turn in the war at sea. When Admiral Sampson hit on a scheme to block the channel from Santiago harbor by sinking the collier *Merrimac* in its midpassage, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson accepted the assignment. Enemy fire, however, disrupted the plan. Hobson and his crew were unable to scuttle the vessel at the critical spot or make their way to rescue craft. The next day, just as Americans were beginning to despair of Hobson's fate, Admiral Cervera sent a message to his blockaders: he had captured Hobson and his men and now offered assurances of their well-being. American officers were impressed. There was, said Captain Robley Evans, "never a more courteous thing done in war."

A reconsideration of the enemy begun with Cervera's note ended with the destruction of the Spanish fleet. American naval officers who on July 4 inflicted terrible destruction on the Spaniards immediately felt a sympathy for foes crushed so decisively. Evans was sorry for Cervera, who was hauled from the water and then received with military honors and champagne. There was an even greater measure of sympathy and respect when Americans soon discovered the abominable physical condition of the vessels in which the Spaniards had tried to fight them. The ties of professional standards were cemented; with wretched resources, the Spaniards had played the game honorably. . . . For many Americans the ally of early 1898 had become enemy and the enemy, ally.

In a 1912 article entitled "The Passing of San Juan Hill," Richard Harding Davis reported that on a return visit to Cuba he had found changes "startling and confusing." The course of the San Juan River had altered and obliterated the Bloody Bend of such moment to the battle. More troubling was the Cuban view of what had happened on that terrain fourteen years earlier. The battlefield guide insisted that American forces, arriving just as the Cubans were about to conquer the Spaniards, had by luck alone received all the credit. He further reported that Cubans now ranked the fighting qualities of their Spanish foes much higher than those of their American allies.